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Abstract-. In the electricity market environment, how to build 
optimal bidding strategies has become a major concern for 
generation companies. The deficiency of transmission capacity 
could lead to congestion, and as a result, the whole electricity 
market can then he actually divided into two or more 
suhmarkets. A direct consequence of transmission congestion is 
the change of competitive positions of generdtion companies 
concerned in the electricity market, and the optimal bidding 
strategies of them should accordingly he changed. In this paper, 
the problem of developing optimal bidding strategies for 
generation companies is systematically investigated with 
transmission capacity constraints taken into account. A 
stochastic optimization model is first formulated under the 
presumption that the bidding behaviors of rival generation 
companies could be modeled as normal probability distributions. 
An approach is next presented for solving the optimization 
problem using the well-known Munte Carlo simulation method 
and the genetic algorithm. Finally, a simple sample example and 
the modified IEEE 1Chus system are employed to illustrate the 
essential features ofthe proposed model and method. 
Index Terms- electricity market, Bidding strategy, congestion 
management, market power, Monte Carlo simulation, genetic 
algorithm 
1. INTRODUCTION 
n the process of power industry restructuring, how to 
Tmanage congestion caused by transmission capacity 
deficiency is a very important problem of extensive 
concern. Although transmission congestion also happened in 
the operation of the traditional monopoly power system, the 
problem could easily be solved by re-dispatching the outputs 
of generation units by the well-known preventive or corrective 
dispatching since changing the outputs of generation units 
does not lead to the reallocation o f economic benefits. 
However, in the electricity market environment, each 
generation company has the objective of maximizing its own 
benefit, and this is conflict with the objectives of other 
generation companies. Since generation re-dispatching can 
have an influence on the benefits of generation companies, 
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fairness is an important issue to be looked after in congestion 
management, in addition to the well-acknowledged power 
system security. Hence, the problem is much more 
complicated and difficult than that in the traditional power 
system. Moreover, the operation patterns of power systems in 
the electricity market environment may be very different from 
those in traditional power systems and, moreover, change 
more frequently since generation dispatching is hid-based 
rather than cost-based. In addition, since transmission systems 
were planned and constructed based on traditional generation 
planning and dispatching patterns, transmission congestion 
occurs more frequently in the new market environment than 
that in the traditional power system operation. 
In the electricity market environment, transmission 
congestion management is not only a technical problem. 
Under some circumstances, transmission congestion could 
divide the whole electricity market into two or more 
suhmarkets and remarkably change the competitive positions 
of generation companies concerned in the electricity market. 
The profits of some generation companies will he reduced and 
those of others increased as a result of transmission 
congestion. It is hence expected that the prospected 
transmission congestion can have important impacts on the 
bidding strategies of generation companies. 
To build optimal bidding strategies for generation 
companies or through this to investigate their potential abuse 
of market power in electricity markets is a very active 
research area and considerable amount of research work has 
been done" 'I, and in Ref. [ 11 a comprehensive survey was 
made. Some research work has been done on examining the 
strategic behavior of some generation companies of unique 
geographical positions to intentionally cause transmission 
congestions so as to increase however, to the best 
of our knowledge, a systematic approach to develop optimal 
bidding strategies for generation companies with transmission 
congestion taken into account is still not available. 
Many different methods are employed to manage 
transmission congestion in several operating electricity 
markets[']. Obviously, different congestion management 
methods especially different settlement rules concerned could 
lead to different optimal bidding strategies for generation 
companies. Based on the congestion management method 
utilized in the former England and Wales electricity market in  
which the so-called uplift is used for congestion management, 
an optimal bidding strategy model is developed in this work. 
The framework of the developed method can be extended and 
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applied to clectricity markets with other congestion 
management methods employed, although, as expected, the 
details concerned need to he modified. The proposcd model 
could he uscd to investigate the potential that generation 
companies manipulate thc electricity market and exercise 
market power as a result of transmission capacity 
deficiency"". Based on the method proposed in Ref. [3] and 
assuming that thc bidding behaviors of rival generation 
companies could he represented by normal probability 
distributions (an implicit assumption is actually made here 
that the electricity market studied is operating in a mature 
state and thus the rivals' bidding behaviors can be estimated 
as probability distributions based on historical bidding data), 
the problem of building optimal bidding strategies for 
generation companies is formulated as a stochastic 
optimization model and solved by the well-known Monte 
Carlo simulation mcthod and Genetic Algorithm. Finally, a 
simple example and the modified IEEE 1Cbus system are 
served for illustrating the hasic feature of the proposed model 
and method. 
11. INTRODUC'llON OF THE ELECTRICITY MARKET STUDIED 
The research work in this paper is based on the so-called 
single-buyer electricity market model. In this kind of 
electricity markets, generation companies (GENCOs) act as 
sellers and the transmission company or a power trading and 
dispatching center as the single buyer purchasing power 
energy from GENCOs based on load forecasting and bids 
from GENCOs and selling to consumers. The power trading 
and dispatching center is responsible for market trading and 
power system operation. The power trading is done daily and 
GENCOs are required to bid for the 48 (half-hour) periods in 
the next trading day before it starts. It is also assumed that 
GENCOs are required to bid a linear non-decreasing supply 
function and the uniform market clearing price (MCP) is 
employed for settlement. 
When the unconstrained generation dispatching could 
result in  transmission congestion, the uplift was used to 
manage congestion in the former England and Wales 
electricity market as stated before. There are two prices 
associated: power purchase price (PPP) paid to GENCOs by 
the single buyer and power sale price (PSP) sold to consumers 
(here consumers refer to distribution companies and large 
customers). PPP = A+ C p  , and /z is the MCP and c, the 
capacity payment calculated by C,,=LOLPx(VLL- 2 ). LOLP 
is the Loss Of Load Probability and VLL the Value of Lost 
Load. In the former England and Wales electricity market, 
LOLP was generally around 0.001 and VLL 2000- 
3000f/MWh. The energy prices paid to GENCOs can be 
classified into four kinds. When a generation unit is included 
in the unconstrained generation dispatching and also actually 
operated in the trading day, the price paid is PPP. When a 
generation unit is included in the unconstrained generation 
dispatching but doesn't he actually operated as required by 
the power trading and dispatching center due to transmission 
congestion, the price paid is PPP minus the unit's actual bid. 
When a generating unit bids but is not included in the 
unconstrained generation dispatching, however it is required 
to generate powcr by the powcr trading and dispatching centcr 
in the real-time operation, the price paid is the unit's actual 
hid plus C,> . When a generating unit bids but is not included 
in the unconstrained generation dispatching, and not required 
to generate power by the power trading and dispatching center 
in  the real-time operation, the price paid is C p  only. 
PSP=PPP+ uplift. The uplift includes transmission losses, 
dispatching cost, ancillary service cost and costs incurred by 
transmission constraints due to non-merit based dispatching. 
In summary, the congestion management employed in the 
former England and Wales electricity market was done by re- 
dispatching generation units, and this resulted in the increase 
of the uplift and hence that of PSP. 
111. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
Suppose that the power system to be studied consists of N 
independent GENCOs. To simplify the presentation, assume 
that each GENCO has only one registered unit (but the 
following method can he extended to general cases without 
technical difficulties). A GENCO builds a hid based on many 
factors such as the load forecasted, estimation of rivals' 
bidding behaviors, its own production cost and risk taking 
prefercnce. Suppose GENCOs are required to bid a linear 
supply function and the bidding function of the ith GENCO is 
9 =a, +P,9,  , ( Q,mn 5 9 .  S e , , ,  ; i=1,2 
($/MWh) is the bidding price at output q, , e,,, and Q,mn are 
the upper and lower limits of active power output 
respectively, a, and p, are both bidding coefficients. The 
system load forecasted is D. After the power trading and 
dispatching center receives all the bids from GENCOs, the 
unconstrained generation dispatching is carried out first. 
Then, the generation dispatching is checked against the 
transmission capacity constraints. I f  transmission congestion 
occurs, the dispatching must he modified to remove the 
congcstion, and this is the so-called congestion management 
procedure. The objective of the re-dispatching is to minimize 
the whole purchasing cost of energy. In this paper, only the 
problem of building the optimal bidding strategy for the one- 
period auction is addressed, and thus inter-temporal operating 
constraints for a generator, such as the minimum up and down 
times and the maximum number of start-ups and shutdowns 
allowed, are not accounted for. 
Suppose that the ith GENCO bids all its generation 
capacity Qi,, , and there are several different scenarios of 
being dispatched as detailed below. If the dispatched output of 
the ith GENCO in the unconstrained dispatching is q ,  q ,  = 0 
represents that the ith GENCO is not dispatched) and this 
dispatching doesn't result in transmission congestion, the fee 
paid to this GENCO in a unit time is Aq, + C,Q,,. . If the 
unconstrained dispatching results in transmission congestion, 
the dispatching must he modified and in this case suppose that 
the output increment of the ith GENCO, as a result of 
transmission congestion management, is A q , .  When Aq, > O ,  
the fee paid to the GENCO in a unit time is 
Aq, + j: **' (a, + p,x)dx + CnQ,,. and when Aq, < 0 ,  the fee 
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is A(q, +A4,)+1:+&,(A-a, -P,x-)dx+C,Q,,,,. 
If U is uscd to denote the status of the transmission 
congestion (U=O or 1 respectively indicates that the 
unconstrained dispatching does or does not result in 
transmission congestion), and q, + UAq, thc actual dispatched 
output of the ith GENCO, then a general formula representing 
the profit R of the ith GENCO in a unit time, applicable to 
all scenarios described before, could be obtained as follow, 
a=&, +I: *LwI’ (9 + fi~W+C,Q,, -& + U 4 ,  ) 
=& + ~ ~ 4 , + ~ I ( q j + U 4 , ) ’ - q , ’ l + C ~ Q _ ~ - ~ ~ + ~ ~ , )  P (1) 
where, C(.) is the generation production cost function which is 
generally described as a quadratic one, 
U;, bj and c; are generation production cost function 
coefficients. 
Hence, for the ith GENCO, the objective of building the 
optimal bidding strategy for a one-period auction is to 
determine optimal bidding coefficients a, and ,L?, to 
maximize its profit R . The problem can be formulated as, 
C(q,)=a, +44, +c,q,> (2) 
Maximize R (3) 
QZmn 5 9 ,  5Q,m. 
, .B 
Subject to: 
(4) i e, + b,4, 5 A””, 
A,, is the upper limit of the bidding price of GENCOs as 
specified by market trading protocols. 
IV. CALCULATION OF R 
As stated before, after the power trading and dispatching 
center receives all bids from GENCOs, the unconstrained 
transmission dispatching is first carried out to determine the 
output level 9, (i=1,2 ,..., N) and the MCP A . If the 
unconstrained dispatching results in transmission congestion, 
re-dispatching will be made to adjust the outputs of 
generators, i.e. to determine 4,. 
A. Calculatiuns uf 1 and q, 
The unconstrained dispatching problem can be formulated 
as, 
a ,+p ,q i=A ( i = 1 , 2 , . . . N )  
f 9 ,  = D  
/=I 
limits, it must be modified to accommodate these limits. 
Specifically, when qi is smaller than its lower limit Q,mn , q, 
should be set to zero rather than e,,,. and the GENCO 
removed from the gcneration dispatching since thc GENCO 
ceases to he competitivc. When i t  is larger than the upper 
limit its value is set to Q,-  and Eqn. ( 5 )  ignored for this 
GENCO since it is no longer a marginal generator. In these 
two cases, Eqn. ( 5 )  no longer holds for GENCO i .  Obviously, 
/I and qi are the functions of all GENCOs’ bidding 
coefficients a , a n d  P, ( i= l ,  2, ... , N). 
B. Culculution of Aq, 
As already stated before, if the unconstrained dispatching 
leads to transmission congestion, it must be modified to 
respect the transmission capacity constraints, i.e., to conduct 
the so-called congestion management to remove congestion, 
i.e. to determine the adjusted output A9, ( ; = I ,  2, ..., N). 
A congestion management model is presented here based 
on the congestion management mechanism introduced before. 
The objective is to minimize the uplift cost such incurred, i.e., 
the so-called congestion cost. Obviously, the congestion cost 
is the difference between the purchasing cost of the modified 
dispatching and that of the unconstrained dispatching. 
The purchasing cost in the unconstrained dispatching is, 
f ( A x q ,  + C p x Q , , , )  (9) 
,=I 
The purchasing cost of the modified dispatching with the 
congestion management is, 
i(4, 1=1 +F’“, (4 +&W+CpQ,mx) 
=~~~,+a.Aq,+-i-L(rl ,+Aq,) ’ -q, ’ l+C”Q,_. J i l  P, ) (10) 
The congestion cost is the difference between Eqn. (10) 
and Eqn. (9), 
(1 1) 
Hence, the congestion management can be described as the 
I P Ccon ,=, 4 0 4 ,  +<[(q, +4,)’ -9,*1 ”( 
following optimization problem, 
Minimize Ccn,, (12) 
*,.‘!u....@~ 
Subject to: 
I )  
2) 
Inequality constrains of generation outputs, 
Equality constraint of power balance, 
QamD 5 9, + Aqj 5 Q,,, (13) 
For 9 , ,  the inequality constraint as described in the first 
formula in Eqn. (4) must bc respected. When the inequality 
constraints are ignored, A can easily be obtained by solving 
Eqns. ( 5 )  and (6). 
3, 
1 = (D + / _ I  i n ,  I P , ) / $  I p, (7 )  
The dispatched output of the ith GENCO, 4, , can be 
obtained from Eqn. (3, 
f ( 9 , + A 4 , ) = 0  1-1 ,i.e. $ A q , = O  ,=I  (14) 
Power flow constraints. Suppose that the DC power flow 
model is employed for the congestion management, 
8 is the bus voltage phase angle vector, Bo is the 
susceptance matrix and P net bus active power injection 
vector 
6 =Bo-’P (15) 
4) Transmission capacity constraints 
%.. 5 (8) 
When the solution of Eqn. (8) violates generation output /‘,“* and e)””, are the active power flow in branch i-j 
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aflcr the congestion management is carried out and thc 
upper limit of the transmission capacity of this branch. 
The congestion management problem with Eqn. ( I  2) as the 
objective function and Eqns. (13) through (16) as constraints 
is a quadratic planning one, and could easily he solved by 
existing methods. 
v. A MONTE CARLO SIMULATION BASED METHOD FOR 
BUILDING OmIMAL BIDDING STRATEGIES 
As a preliminary study, suppose that, from the ith 
GENCO's point of view, the bidding coefficients of thc j th  
rival, a, and ,B, fj=1,2 ,.._, N ;  j f i), obey a joint normal 
distribution with the following probability density function 
(pdO"', 
iJ 
The methods that could he used to determine these 
probability dcnsity functions are discussed briefly in Ref. [3] 
and will not he repeated here. The meanings of the symbols in 
Eqns. (17) are exactly the same as those in Ref. [3]. 
By using the probability density function to describe the 
rivals' bidding behaviors, the problem of building the optimal 
bidding strategy with Eqn. (3) as the objective function and 
Eqn. (4) as constraints then becomes a stochastic optimization 
problem, and could he solved by the well-known Monte Carlo 
simulation method. The Monk Carlo simulation method is 
generally used to provide numerically approximate solutions 
to mathematical, physical and engineering problems by 
performing stochastic simulations and statistical sampling 
experiments on a computer. The basic procedure of solving a 
stochastic optimization problem using this method is as 
follows. First, generate plenty of random samples according to 
the distributions of random variables in the problem studied 
on a computer. Secondly, obtain plenty of trial outcomes by 
solving the problem with all random variables taking sampling 
values. Finally, calculate the statistic parameters such as the 
expectation value or standard deviation of the trial outcomes. 
Usually the expectation value is taken as the final solution to 
the problem. 
Hence, the procedure of building the optimal bidding 
strategy for the ith GENCO, i.e. determining the optimal 
bidding coefficients, by using the Monte Carlo method, is as 
follows. First, generate many random samples according to 
the distributions of random variables, a, and /3, +1,2 ,.,_, N, 
j f i). For each Monte Carlo 5imulation iteration, the 
optimization problem described as (3) through (4) becomes a 
definite optimization problem, and the well-known Genetic 
Algorithm (GA) is employed for solving this problem. Thus, 
in each simulation, a set of optimal, a, and 8, could he 
found. After a pre-specified number of simulations is carried 
out, the expectation values of a, and ,B, are taken as the 
optimal bidding coefficients, i.e. the optimal bidding strategy. 
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
Two numerical examples are used to illustrate the 
proposed method. 
A. Example1 
A very simple two-bus system with two generation units 
(GENCOs) included, as shown in Fig.1, is first employed. The 
production cost functions of the twq GENCOs, i.e. G I  and 
G2, are Cl(ql)  = 4.68 q1 + 0.0312 q,- and C2(q2) = 9.36 q2 + 
0.1092 4;. respectively. The upper and lower limits of 
generation outputs of these two generation units are both 200 
MW and 30 MW, respectively. There are two loads, i.e. 
Ll=40 MW and L=150 MW, and they are both inelastic to 
the price of electricity. LOLP is set to he 0.001, and VLL 
2€kWh, or approximately 1282 $/MWh. The upper limit of 
the bidding price by GENCOs, i.e. A -, is 250 $/MWh.. 
The rival GENCO is assumed to have an estimated joint 
normal distribution for the two bidding coefficients. For the 
ith GENCO (i=l,2), the estimated parameters in the joint 
normal distributions for the j th  rival GENCO +1,2 and j i i ) ,  
as described in Eqn. (17), are specified in the Monte Carlo 
simulations as (18). 
p:"'=l.Zbj, 4 0 ~ ' = 0 . 1 5 h j a  cry =0.15b{4; 
&"=1.2x2cj.. 4 f lY=O. l5c j2  O:"'=O.I5c{4, p, =-0.1 
(18) w L d O M W  L,=ISOMW 
Fig.1 A 2-bus system 
It should he mentioned that the parameters in Eqn. (18) 
ould he estimated using available mathematical methods (such 
as statistical methods) based on sufficient historical bidding 
data. These parameters are specified here to illustrate the 
basic feature of the method developed. Detailed explanations 
about these specifications are given in Ref. [3]. 
Many simulation tests were canied out using the Monte 
Carlo method, and the number of simulations is specified to 
he 10000. For each simulation, the bidding coefficients of 
rivals are fixed and the optimal bidding coefficients of the 
studied GENCO are then determined using the GA. The real- 
valued encoding method is utilized in the GA implementation. 
The parameters associated with the F A  are specified as 
follows: the population size is 20, and the maximum permitted 
number of iteration is 30. A set of the optimal bidding 
coefficients o,and B j  can then he found in each simulation. 
Finally, their expectation values arc used as thc optimal 
bidding coefficients. 
Two cases are tested with different transmission capacities 
to illustrate the proposed method and the impacts of 
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transmission constraints on the optimal bidding strategies of 
GENCO,. 
/) Case 1 
The transmission capacities of the two lines are both 100 
MW. Obviously, transmission congestion will not happen no 
matter how the two GENCOs bid. The optimal bidding 
strategies of the two GENCOs obtained by the proposed 
method are: 
a, =21.8641, p, =0.1410; cr,=21.1615, p,=0.2704 
normal distribution and thc expectation values and standard 
deviations are also specified as in Eqn. ( 1  8) The number of 
the Monte Carlo simulations is specified to be 10000 and the 
parameters of the GA are the same as those i n  Example I. The 
optimal bidding strategies of the five GENCOs are listed in 
Tahlc 11. 
TABLE I UNIT PARAMEERS OFGENERATIOX COMPANIES 
Upper Lower " d e  
l imi lo l  limit of No 
GENCO (I, b, c, 
unit "nil 
If the two GENCOs bid according to these optimal bidding Oulpul output 
strategies, the generation output dispatched are ql=123.2 MW I 0 3.0 0.1375 15 90 1 
*=1756.7$. The power flow in each transmission line is 41.6 5 0 4.0 0.075 15 100 8 
0 5.25 0.0525 20 I00 2 
3 0 3.0 0.0875 20 100 3 
The profits of two GENCOs are Q ,=4030.6$ and Q 4 0 5.0 0.075 20 I20 6 
and qI=66.8MW, respectively, and the MCP is 39.23$/MWh. 
MW. In this case, there is no need to activate the Congestion If all GENCOs bid according to these optimal bidding 
management program. strategies showed in Table 2, the dispatched outputs (in MW) 
of the five generation units by the unconstrained dispatching 
are qt =44.4, yi ~ 7 3 . 7 ,  q, =63.8, q, =61.0, q5=6.1. 
2) Case 2 
Now, let us reduce the transmission capacity of each line to 
50 MW. In this case, the obtained optimal bidding strategies 
ab = 21,8542, p, =0.141 I ; a, =90.0645, p, =0.7990 
The MCP is 16,94 $IMWh, 
of the two GENCOs are, TABLE I1 OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGIES OFGEhZRATION COMPANIES 
optimal bidding suategy 
Compared with the results in Case 1, the optimal bidding GENCO a, B, 
strategy of GI is similar, while the bidding price of G2 is 1 6.4002 0.2374 
7 8.7998 0.1 104 
3 6.6424 0.1615 
enhanced obviously. 
If the two GENCOs bid according to these optimal 4 X 1817 n 1476 
strategies, the dispatched outputs in  the unconstrained 
dispatching are ql=190 MW and q2=OMW, and the MCP is 
48.66 $/MWh. G2 is not dispatched because of its high 
bidding price. However, in this case the total power flow of 
these two lines is IS0 MW, and this exceeds the upper limit of 
the total transmission capacity, i.e. IOOMW. In other word, 
transmission congestion occurs. Thus, GI can only supply 100 
MW to L, and the left 50 MW of Lz must be provided by G2. 
The adjusted outputs of the two GENCOs by the congestion 
management program are Aq,=-5OMW and Aq2=50MW. 
Since the 50 MW supplied by G1 is paid at its own bidding 
price, the higher price it  bids, the larger profit it can obtain 
(note that the bidding price cannot exceed the upper limit of 
the bidding price, as defined by the market rules). Hence, the 
actually dispatched outputs of the two GENCOs are ql=50 
MW and ql=O MW, and the profits of them are 0 ,=S968.4 $ 
and Q 2=5007.6 $, respectively. 
Obviously, when the transmission capacity is insufficient, a 
local submarket could actually be formed at the L2 side. As a 
result, G2 will he a monopoly in this submarket, and could 
raise its bidding price to a very high degree, subject to the 
price cap limitation. It is shown by this very simple example 
that transmission congestion could divide the whole market 
into two or  more submarkets and hence remarkably change 
the competitive positions of GENCOs in the electricity 
market. 
B. Example!! 
This example is the IEEE 14-bus system. The system 
parameters are given in the Ref. [ 1 I] .  ne generation unit. 
Parameters of the five generation units are listed in Table I. 
For the ith GENCO (i=1,2.3,4.5), assume that thc bidding 
parameters of its j th  rival +1.2,3,4,5 and jgi) obey joint 
5 7.5056 0.1427 
The unconstrained dispatching is then chccked against 
transmission capacities by applying thc DC power flow 
computation, and it is found that no congestion occurs. Hence 
this dispatch is technically feasible. The profits ($) of the five 
GENCOs are, 
ni=461.8, !&=703.1, R3~659.7, Q~601.1, Q5=654.3 
Now, let us see how GENCOs will bid if transmission 
congestion is expected to happen. For this purpose, the 
transmission capacities of branch 3 and 17 are supposed to 
decrease from 1.71'"' to 0.25 (in P.u.). Other system 
parameters remain unchanged. The optimal bidding strategies 
for the five GENCOs obtained by the proposed method are 
showed in Table 111. If all the five GENCOs bid according to 
the optimal bidding strategies listed in Table 3, the dispatched 
outputs (in MW) of the five generation units by the 
unconstrained dispatching are, 
TABLE 111 OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGIES OF GENCOS UNDER TRAANSIMISSION 
q, =42.2,q, =IOO.O,q,=66.8,q, =O,q,=IOO.O 
CONGESTION 
optimal bidding slratea 
GENCO Cl, B, 
I 13.8263 0.6552 
2 16.6098 0.0795 
3 13.9608 0.4121 
4 23.5718 0.3510 
5 4.9148 0.1051 
The MCP is 41.48 $/MWh. GENCO 4 is not dispatched 
due to its high bidding price and the bidding capacity of 
GENCO 5 is fully dispatched because of its lowest bidding 
price among all GENCOs. However, when this dispatch is 
checked against transmission capacities by the DC power flow 
computation, it is found that the power flow in branch 3 is 
0.3292 and that in branch 17 0.4833 and the transmission 
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constraints in both branches are violated, or in other word, 
congestions occur in thesc two branches. The adjusted outputs 
or the five GENCOs by the congestion management program 
arc 8q,=27.3,0q~=-60.9,~qJ=-l .4,8q,=120.O,~q~=-85.0. 
The bidding capacity of GENCO 4 is fully dispatched, 
while the output of GENCO 5 is remarkably cut down. 
Transmission congestions in branch 3 and branch 17 are 
removcd in the modified generation dispatch, and the current 
power flows in these two branchcs are both 0.25. Finally, the 
dispatched outputs of the five GENCOs are, 
q,=69.5,q,=39.1,q,=65.4,q,=l2O,q,=15.0 
The profits of these GENCOs are, 
From these results, it is obvious that the transmission 
congestions lead to a remarkable change of the competitive 
position of GENCO 4 in the electricity market, and have great 
impacts on the bidding strategies of generation companies. 
01=2367.5, !&=2617.9, R3=2267.4, RdS824.4, R5=3264.1 
v11. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The optimal bidding strategies for generation companies in 
the competitive electricity market environment are 
investigated in this paper with transmission capacity 
constraints taken into account. The problem is formulated as a 
stochastic optimization model and solved by the Monte Carlo 
simulation method and genetic algorithm. It should be 
mentioned that the emphasis of this paper is on developing a 
methodological framework for solving this problem, rather 
than on how to estimate the bidding behaviors of rivals. Two 
examples are employed to illustrate the proposed method, and 
it is showed that generation companies could utilize 
transmission congestions to manipulate the market. The 
proposed method could also be served for roughly analyzing 
the potential of market power abusing by generation 
companies under the circumstances of transmission 
congestions. 
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